

Special Topics in International Relations: Economic Statecraft

Instructor: Dr. Pei-Yu Wei (peiyu.wei@austin.utexas.edu)

Class hours:

Class location:

Office hours:

Course Overview:

How do states wield their economic power to achieve foreign policy goals? From the Megarian Decree in the Peloponnesian War to China's Belt and Road Initiative, economic statecraft has long been a mainstay in the foreign policy toolbox of political leaders. Economic sanctions, foreign aid, trade, foreign direct investment, etc. are all tools that states have used to achieve political and economic aims. This graduate-level course, taught in a seminar format, looks at how states use economic tools to coerce, persuade, and punish other states. Through the semester students will learn about what motivates countries to engage in economic statecraft, what influences what forms/instruments economic statecraft take, when economic statecraft is effective, and what the consequences of using economic statecraft are. Additionally, students will learn about the theoretical and methodological challenges in the study of economic statecraft, particularly in terms of defining and measuring the uses and outcomes of such policy tools.

Assessments:

1) Discussion Leader (30%; 15% each)

Each student will be responsible for leading two seminar discussions starting Week 2. The discussion leader will briefly go over the material, and then lead the class in a discussion of the readings. In addition, 24 hours before the class they are leading, discussion leaders should submit a short memo to the instructor. The memo should be 3-4 pages long (double spaced), succinctly summarize the papers/chapters assigned for the seminar, explore the ways in which the assigned readings for the week interact with each other and raise questions for further discussion. Students will be graded both on the quality of the memo and of the discussion questions prepared.

2) In-Class Presentation of Paper (10%)

Students will present the main theory and key findings of their research paper to the seminar at the end of the semester.

3) Final Paper (50%)

Each student will write an original research paper (25-30 pages). The paper topic should be discussed with the instructor beforehand and should build upon or be an extension of the topics covered in this course.

4) Class Participation (10%)

As this is a seminar-style course, each student is expected to come to class prepared and actively participate in the discussions throughout the semester.

Office Hours:

Office hours are scheduled every {insert date} at {insert time}. Please make appointment via Doodle {insert sign-up link} prior to meeting with the instructor. All appointments should be made 24 hours prior to the meeting time. If it is not possible for you to meet with the instructor during office hours, please e-mail the instructor to arrange an alternate meeting time.

Required Reading Materials/Textbooks:

Assigned readings are listed each week in the “Class Schedule” section of the syllabus. Readings are composed of both journal articles and books. Journal articles can be accessed through the Duke Library website: <http://library.duke.edu>. Throughout the semester, we will also use the following books often, since most of the chapters are included in assigned readings. It is recommended that you purchase the books. They will also be on hold at the Service Desk at the library.

- Baldwin, David A. *Economic statecraft: New edition*. Princeton University Press, 2020
- Blackwill, Robert D., and Jennifer M. Harris. *War by other means: Geoeconomics and statecraft*. Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Mulder, Nicholas. *The economic weapon: The rise of sanctions as a tool of modern war*. Yale University Press, 2022.

Additionally, students who wish to learn more about the topic may also find the following books useful. The following books are *recommended*, though not required.

- Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman. *Power and the purse: Economic statecraft, interdependence and national security*. Routledge, 2014.
- Drezner, Daniel W. *The sanctions paradox: Economic statecraft and international relations*. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Norris, William J. *Chinese economic statecraft: Commercial actors, grand strategy and state control*. Cornell University Press, 2016.

Lastly, it is also recommended that students read or skim through newspapers and magazines such as the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Economist, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, etc. to keep up with current events.

Grading Scale:

The scale that will be applied for each graded element, and or the final grade, is listed below. There will be no rounding up of the weighted cumulative numerical score in calculating the final letter grade.

98-100	A+
93-97	A
90-92	A-
87-89	B+
83-86	B
80-82	B-
77-79	C+
73-76	C
70-72	C-
67-69	D+
63-66	D
60-62	D-
<60	F

Special Note on Academic Integrity:

Students taking this class are expected to comply with the Duke Community Standard, which is available to view at <http://www.integrity.duke.edu/ugrad/student.html>.

Additional Resources:

TWP Writing Studio:

The Thompson Writing Program’s Writing Studio provides writing resources to students at any stage of the paper-writing process. The Writing Studio is located at Bivins 107 on Duke’s East Campus, and at Perkins 112 on Duke’s West Campus. You can schedule face-to-face appointments with a reader, who will help guide you and give you feedback on your work. For more information, visit <http://twp.duke.edu/twp-writing-studio>.

Student Disability Access Office (SDAO):

Everyone learns in different ways, and I will try ensuring that my class is accessible in different mediums. However, if there is an accommodation that I could make to make the learning experience, including the course materials, lectures, discussion sections, etc. more inclusive, please let me know. Alternatively, you can also contact the SDAO. More information can be found at: <http://access.duke.edu/>.

Counseling and Psychological Services (CAPS):

College can be stressful. During the semester, if you find that you are having challenges due to health problems, life stressors or emotional difficulties, please consider consulting CAPS. More information can be found at: <http://studentaffairs.duke.edu/caps/about-us>

Class Schedule:

Week 1 (August 31st) – Introduction to the Course and Understanding Economic Statecraft

Required Readings:

- Baldwin, David A. *Economic statecraft: New edition*. Princeton University Press, 2020. Ch 1-4, Ch 7.
- Blackwill, Robert D., and Jennifer M. Harris. *War by other means: Geoeconomics and statecraft*. Harvard University Press, 2016. Ch 1-3.
- Early, Bryan R., and Keith Preble, 'Grand Strategy and the Tools of Economic Statecraft', in Thierry Balzacq, and Ronald R. Krebs (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy* (2021; online edn, Oxford Academic, 8 Sept. 2021)

Week 2 (September 6th) – Foreign Aid Motivation

Required Readings:

- Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. "Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 5.1 (2000): 33-63
- Baldwin, David A. *Economic statecraft: New edition*. Princeton University Press, 2020. Ch. 10.
- Chong, Alberto, and Mark Gradstein. "What determines foreign aid? The donors' perspective." *Journal of Development Economics* 87.1 (2008): 1-13.
- Dreher, Axel, and Andreas Fuchs. "Rogue aid? The determinants of China's aid allocation." *The Determinants of China's Aid Allocation (September 6, 2011)*. *Courant Research Centre Discussion Paper* 93 (2011).
- Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James Raymond Vreeland. "Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council." *European Economic Review* 53.7 (2009): 742-757.
- Greene, Zachary D., and Amanda A. Licht. "Domestic politics and changes in foreign aid allocation: the role of party preferences." *Political Research Quarterly* 71.2 (2018): 284-301.
- Oatley, Thomas, and Jason Yackee. "American interests and IMF lending." *International Politics* 41.3 (2004): 415-429.

Recommended Readings:

- Balla, Eliana, and Gina Yannitell Reinhardt. "Giving and receiving foreign aid: does conflict count?" *World Development* 36.12 (2008): 2566-2585.
- Heinrich, Tobias. "When is foreign aid selfish, when is it selfless?" *The Journal of Politics* 75.2 (2013): 422-435.
- Meernik, James, Eric L. Krueger, and Steven C. Poe. "Testing models of US foreign policy: Foreign aid during and after the Cold War." *The Journal of Politics* 60.1 (1998): 63-85.
- Palmer, Glenn, Scott B. Wohlander, and T. Clifton Morgan. "Give or take: Foreign aid and foreign policy substitutability." *Journal of Peace Research* 39.1 (2002): 5-26.

- Rioux, Jean-Sebastien, and Douglas A. Van Belle. "The influence of Le Monde coverage on French foreign aid allocations." *International Studies Quarterly* 49.3 (2005): 481-502.
- Strand, Jonathan R., and John P. Tuman. "Foreign aid and voting behavior in an international organization: the case of Japan and the International Whaling Commission." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8.4 (2012): 409-430.
- Wang, Te-Yu. "US foreign aid and UN voting: An analysis of important issues." *International Studies Quarterly* 43.1 (1999): 199-210.

Week 3 (September 13th) – Foreign Aid Effectiveness

Required Readings:

- Bapat, Navin A. "Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent." *Journal of Peace Research* 48.3 (2011): 303-318.
- Bearce, David H., and Daniel C. Tirone. "Foreign aid effectiveness and the strategic goals of donor governments." *The Journal of Politics* 72.3 (2010): 837-851.
- Boone, Peter. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid." *European economic review* 40.2 (1996): 289-329.
- Dietrich, Simone, and Joseph Wright. "Foreign aid allocation tactics and democratic change in Africa." *The Journal of Politics* 77.1 (2015): 216-234.
- Dreher, Axel, et al. "The costs of favoritism: is politically driven aid less effective?" *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 62.1 (2013): 157-191.

Recommended Readings:

- Angeles, Luis, and Kyriakos C. Neanidis. "Aid effectiveness: the role of the local elite." *Journal of Development Economics* 90.1 (2009): 120-134.
- Moreira, Sandrina Berthault. "Evaluating the impact of foreign aid on economic growth: A cross-country study." *Journal of Economic Development* 30.2 (2005): 25-48.
- Headey, Derek. "Geopolitics and the effect of foreign aid on economic growth: 1970–2001." *Journal of International Development: The Journal of the Development Studies Association* 20.2 (2008): 161-180.
- Wright, Joseph. "To invest or insure? How authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness." *Comparative Political Studies* 41.7 (2008): 971-1000.
- Wright, Joseph. "Aid effectiveness and the politics of personalism." *Comparative Political Studies* 43.6 (2010): 735-762.

Week 4 (September 20th) – Trade, Foreign Policy, and Conflict

Required Readings:

- Bussmann, Margit. "Foreign direct investment and militarized international conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 47.2 (2010): 143-153.

- Bütthe, Tim, and Helen V. Milner. "The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: increasing FDI through international trade agreements?." *American journal of political science* 52.4 (2008): 741-762.
- Chen, Qin, and Yi Zhou. "Whose trade follows the flag? Institutional constraints and economic responses to bilateral relations." *Journal of Peace Research* 58.6 (2021): 1207-1223.
- Hegre, Håvard, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett. "Trade does promote peace: New simultaneous estimates of the reciprocal effects of trade and conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 47.6 (2010): 763-774.
- Morrow, James D. "How could trade affect conflict?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36.4 (1999): 481-489.
- Pollins, Brian M. "Does trade still follow the flag?" *American Political Science Review* 83.2 (1989): 465-480.

Recommended Readings:

- DiGiuseppe, Matthew, and Colin M. Barry. "Do consumers follow the flag? Perceptions of hostility and consumer preferences." *International Interactions* (2022): 1-16.
- Lee, Hoon, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. "Foreign direct investment and territorial disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56.4 (2012): 675-703.
- Li, Quan. "Foreign direct investment and interstate military conflict." *Journal of International Affairs* (2008): 53-66.
- Oneal, John R., and Bruce Russett. "Assessing the liberal peace with alternative specifications: Trade still reduces conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 36.4 (1999): 423-442
- Polachek, Solomon William. "Conflict and trade." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24.1 (1980): 55-78.
- Pollins, Brian M. "Conflict, cooperation, and commerce: The effect of international political interactions on bilateral trade flows." *American Journal of Political Science* (1989): 737-761

Week 5 (September 27th) – Trade and Economic Statecraft

Required Readings:

- Blackwill, Robert D., and Jennifer M. Harris. *War by other means: Geoeconomics and statecraft*. Harvard University Press, 2016. Ch 6 -7.
- Baldwin, David A. *Economic statecraft: New edition*. Princeton University Press, 2020. Ch. 9.
- Chilton, Adam S. "The political motivations of the United States' bilateral investment treaty program." *Review of International Political Economy* 23.4 (2016): 614-642.
- Davis, Christina L., Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson. "State control and the effects of foreign relations on bilateral trade." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63.2 (2019): 405-438.

- Gartzke, Erik, and Quan Li. "Measure for measure: Concept operationalization and the trade interdependence-conflict debate." *Journal of Peace Research* 40.5 (2003): 553-571.
- Tingley, Dustin, et al. "The political economy of inward FDI: opposition to Chinese mergers and acquisitions." *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8.1 (2015): 27-57.

Recommended Readings:

- Sohn, Yul, and Min Gyo Koo. "Securitizing trade: The case of the Korea–US free trade agreement." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 11.3 (2011): 433-460.
- Urdinez, Francisco, et al. "Chinese economic statecraft and US hegemony in Latin America: an empirical analysis, 2003–2014." *Latin American Politics and Society* 58.4 (2016): 3-30
- Younas, Javed. "Motivation for bilateral aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits." *European Journal of Political Economy* 24.3 (2008): 661-674

Week 6 (October 4th) – Consequences of Economic Statecraft: Positive Sanctions

Required Readings:

- Bashir, Omar S., and Darren J. Lim. "Misplaced blame: foreign aid and the consequences of UN Security Council membership." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57.3 (2013): 509-523
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. "Aid: Blame it all on "Easy money"." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57.3 (2013): 524-537.
- Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. "Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government repression." *International Organization* 59.3 (2005): 593-629.
- Manger, Mark S., and Mark A. Pickup. "The coevolution of trade agreement networks and democracy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 60.1 (2016): 164-191.
- Savun, Burcu, and Daniel C. Tirone. "Foreign aid, democratization, and civil conflict: how does democracy aid affect civil conflict?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55.2 (2011): 233-246.

Recommended Readings:

- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. "Foreign aid and policy concessions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51.2 (2007): 251-284.
- Garriga, Ana Carolina, and Brian J. Phillips. "Foreign aid as a signal to investors: Predicting FDI in post-conflict countries." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58.2 (2014): 280-306.
- Licht, Amanda A. "Coming into money: The impact of foreign aid on leader survival." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54.1 (2010): 58-87.
- Mihalache-O'Keef, Andreea S. "Whose greed, whose grievance, and whose opportunity? Effects of foreign direct investments (FDI) on internal conflict." *World Development* 106 (2018): 187-206.

- Simmons, Beth A. "Rules over real estate: trade, territorial conflict, and international borders as institution." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49.6 (2005): 823-848.

Negative Sanctions

Week 7 (October 11th) – Introduction to Economic Sanctions

Required Readings:

- Drezner, Daniel W. "Sanctions sometimes smart: targeted sanctions in theory and practice." *International studies review* 13.1 (2011): 96-108.
- Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. *Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy*. Vol. 1. Peterson Institute, 1990. Ch 2.
- Kirshner, Jonathan. "Review essay: Economic sanctions: The state of the art." *Security Studies* 11.4 (2002): 160-179.
- Mulder, Nicholas. *The economic weapon: The rise of sanctions as a tool of modern war*. Yale University Press, 2022. Pg.1-26; 129-290.

Recommended Readings:

- Barber, James. "Economic sanctions as a policy instrument." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 55.3 (1979): 367-384
- Drezner, Daniel W. "Targeted sanctions in a world of global finance." *International Interactions* 41.4 (2015): 755-764.
- Kobayashi, Yoshiharu. "Economic sanction as foreign policy." *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. 2017.
- Wallensteen, Peter. "Characteristics of economic sanctions." *Journal of peace research* 5.3 (1968): 248-267.

Week 8 (October 18th) – The Threat vs. Imposition of Economic Sanctions

Required Readings:

- Afesorgbor, Sylvanus Kwaku. "The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions?" *European Journal of Political Economy* 56 (2019): 11-26.
- Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Valentin Krustev. "The threat and imposition of economic sanctions, 1971—2000." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26.1 (2009): 92-110
- Krustev, Valentin L. "Strategic demands, credible threats, and economic coercion outcomes." *International Studies Quarterly* 54.1 (2010): 147-174.
- Whang, Taehee, Elena V. McLean, and Douglas W. Kuberski. "Coercion, information, and the success of sanction threats." *American journal of political science* 57.1 (2013): 65-81

Recommended Readings:

- Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshiharu Kobayashi. "Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31.5 (2014): 541-558.
- Walentek, Dawid, et al. "Success of economic sanctions threats: coercion, information and commitment." *International Interactions* 47.3 (2021): 417-448.

Week 9 (October 25th) – Why/When do States Impose Economic Sanctions?

Required Readings:

- Lacy, Dean, and Emerson MS Niou. "A theory of economic sanctions and issue linkage: The roles of preferences, information, and threats." *The journal of politics* 66.1 (2004): 25-42.
- McLean, Elena V., and Taehee Whang. "Designing foreign policy: Voters, special interest groups, and economic sanctions." *Journal of Peace Research* 51.5 (2014): 589-602
- Nielsen, Richard A. "Rewarding human rights? Selective aid sanctions against repressive states." *International Studies Quarterly* 57.4 (2013): 791-803.
- Lacy, Dean, and Emerson MS Niou. "A theory of economic sanctions and issue linkage: The roles of preferences, information, and threats." *The journal of politics* 66.1 (2004): 25-42.
- Whang, Taehee. "Playing to the home crowd? Symbolic use of economic sanctions in the United States." *International Studies Quarterly* 55.3 (2011): 787-801.

Recommended Readings:

- Bienen, Henry, and Robert Gilpin. "Economic sanctions as a response to terrorism." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 3.1 (1980): 89-98.
- Drury, A. Cooper. "Sanctions as coercive diplomacy: The US President's decision to initiate economic sanctions." *Political Research Quarterly* 54.3 (2001): 485-508.
- Kohno, Masaru, et al. "Donor competition and public support for foreign aid sanctions." *Political Research Quarterly* 74.1 (2021): 212-227.
- Peksen, Dursun, Timothy M. Peterson, and A. Cooper Drury. "Media-driven humanitarianism? News media coverage of human rights abuses and the use of economic sanctions." *International Studies Quarterly* 58.4 (2014): 855-866.
- Tama, Jordan. "Forcing the president's hand: How the US congress shapes foreign policy through sanctions legislation." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 16.3 (2020): 397-416.

Week 10 (November 1st) – The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions

Required Readings:

- Ang, Adrian U-Jin, and Dursun Peksen. "When do economic sanctions work? Asymmetric perceptions, issue salience, and outcomes." *Political Research Quarterly* 60.1 (2007): 135-145.
- Bapat, Navin A., et al. "Determinants of sanctions effectiveness: Sensitivity analysis using new data." *International Interactions* 39.1 (2013): 79-98.

- Dorff, Cassy, and Shahryar Minhas. "When do states say uncle? Network dependence and sanction compliance." *International Interactions* 43.4 (2017): 563-588
- Drezner, Daniel W. "Bargaining, enforcement, and multilateral sanctions: when is cooperation counterproductive?" *International organization* 54.1 (2000): 73-102.
- Morgan, T. Clifton, and Valerie L. Schwebach. "Fools suffer gladly: The use of economic sanctions in international crises." *International Studies Quarterly* 41.1 (1997): 27-50.
- Nooruddin, Irfan. "Modeling selection bias in studies of sanctions efficacy." *International Interactions* 28.1 (2002): 59-75.
- Whang, Taehee. "Structural estimation of economic sanctions: From initiation to outcomes." *Journal of Peace Research* 47.5 (2010): 561-573

Recommended Readings:

- Baldwin, David A., and Robert A. Pape. "Evaluating economic sanctions." *International Security* 23.2 (1998): 189-198.
- Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis, and Benjamin Radcliff. "On the determinants of the success of economic sanctions: An empirical analysis." *American Journal of Political Science* (1997): 608-618.
- Dizaji, Sajjad Faraji, and Peter AG Van Bergeijk. "Potential early phase success and ultimate failure of economic sanctions: A VAR approach with an application to Iran." *Journal of Peace Research* 50.6 (2013): 721-736.
- Pape, Robert A. "Why economic sanctions do not work." *International security* 22.2 (1997): 90-136.
- Peksen, Dursun. "Autocracies and economic sanctions: The divergent impact of authoritarian regime type on sanctions success." *Defence and Peace Economics* 30.3 (2019): 253-268.
- Peterson, Timothy M. "Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability: Trade ties, sanction threats, and the success of economic coercion." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37.4 (2020): 409-429.
- Kaempfer, William H., and Anton D. Lowenberg. "The theory of international economic sanctions: A public choice approach." *The American Economic Review* 78.4 (1988): 786-793.
- Tsebelis, George. "Are sanctions effective? A game-theoretic analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34.1 (1990): 3-28.

Week 11 (November 8th) – The Duration and Termination of Economic Sanctions

Required Readings:

- Bolks, Sean M., and Dina Al-Sowayel. "How long do economic sanctions last? Examining the sanctioning process through duration." *Political Research Quarterly* 53.2 (2000): 241-265.
- Dorussen, Han, and Jongryn Mo. "Ending economic sanctions: Audience costs and rent-seeking as commitment strategies." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45.4 (2001): 395-426.

- McGillivray, Fiona, and Allan C. Stam. "Political institutions, coercive diplomacy, and the duration of economic sanctions." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48.2 (2004): 154-172.
- Krustev, Valentin L., and T. Clifton Morgan. "Ending economic coercion: Domestic politics and international bargaining." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28.4 (2011): 351-376.

Recommended Readings:

- Attia, Hana, and Julia Grauvogel. "International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* (2022): 00223433221087080.
- Attia, Hana, Julia Grauvogel, and Christian von Soest. "The termination of international sanctions: explaining target compliance and sender capitulation." *European Economic Review* 129 (2020): 103565.
- Jeong, Jin Mun. "Do sanction types affect the duration of economic sanctions? The case of foreign aid." *International Political Science Review* 40.2 (2019): 231-245.

Week 12 (November 15th) – Consequences of Economic Statecraft: Negative Sanctions’ Human Impact

Required Readings:

- Allen, Susan Hannah, and David J. Lektzian. "Economic sanctions: A blunt instrument?" *Journal of Peace Research* 50.1 (2013): 121-135.
- Afesorgbor, Sylvanus Kwaku, and Renuka Mahadevan. "The impact of economic sanctions on income inequality of target states." *World Development* 83 (2016): 1-11
- Drury, A. Cooper, and Dursun Peksen. "Women and economic statecraft: The negative impact international economic sanctions visit on women." *European Journal of International Relations* 20.2 (2014): 463-490.
- Gutmann, Jerg, Matthias Neuenkirch, and Florian Neumeier. "Sanctioned to death? The impact of economic sanctions on life expectancy and its gender gap." *The Journal of Development Studies* 57.1 (2021): 139-162.
- Liou, Ryan Yu-Lin, Amanda Murdie, and Dursun Peksen. "Revisiting the causal links between economic sanctions and human rights violations." *Political Research Quarterly* 74.4 (2021): 808-821.
- Peksen, Dursun. "Better or worse? The effect of economic sanctions on human rights." *Journal of Peace Research* 46.1 (2009): 59-77.

Recommended Readings:

- Gutmann, Jerg, Matthias Neuenkirch, and Florian Neumeier. "Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights." *Public Choice* 185.1 (2020): 161-182.
- Jeong, Jin Mun. "Economic sanctions and income inequality: impacts of trade restrictions and foreign aid suspension on target countries." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37.6 (2020): 674-693.

- Peksen, Dursun. "Economic sanctions and human security: the public health effect of economic sanctions." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7.3 (2011): 237-251.
- Wood, Reed M. "'A hand upon the throat of the nation': Economic sanctions and state repression, 1976–2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 52.3 (2008): 489-513.

Week 13 (November 22nd) – No Class Due to Thanksgiving Break

Week 14 (November 29th) – Consequences of Economic Statecraft: Negative Sanction's Political and Violent Effect

Required Readings:

- Escribà-Folch, Abel. "Economic sanctions and the duration of civil conflicts." *Journal of Peace Research* 47.2 (2010): 129-141.
- Hultman, Lisa, and Dursun Peksen. "Successful or counterproductive coercion? The effect of international sanctions on conflict intensity." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61.6 (2017): 1315-1339.
- Lektzian, David, and Patrick M. Regan. "Economic sanctions, military interventions, and civil conflict outcomes." *Journal of Peace Research* 53.4 (2016): 554-568.
- Marinov, Nikolay. "Do economic sanctions destabilize country leaders?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49.3 (2005): 564-576.
- Peksen, Dursun, and A. Cooper Drury. "Coercive or corrosive: The negative impact of economic sanctions on democracy." *International Interactions* 36.3 (2010): 240-264.

Recommended Readings:

- Choi, Seung-Whan, and Shali Luo. "Economic sanctions, poverty, and international terrorism: An empirical analysis." *International Interactions* 39.2 (2013): 217-245.
- Escribà-Folch, Abel. "Authoritarian responses to foreign pressure: Spending, repression, and sanctions." *Comparative Political Studies* 45.6 (2012): 683-713.
- Liou, Ryan Yu-Lin, Amanda Murdie, and Dursun Peksen. "Pressures From Home and Abroad: Economic Sanctions and Target Government Response to Domestic Campaigns." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2022): 00220027221118249
- Peksen, Dursun. "Economic sanctions and political stability and violence in target countries." *Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions*. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021.

Week 15 (December 6th) – Presentation of Research Paper to Class