"You're the One I Want: Substitutability, Coalition Costs, and Sanctioning Regimes" (Under Review)

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Abstract: 

When do states choose multilateral sanctions over unilateral ones? Rather than examine downstream disadvantages of multilateral sanctions, such as bargaining and enforcement difficulties, this paper focuses on the tradeoffs inherent in the primary sender’s initial decision. I argue via a formal model that they must balance the cost of establishing and maintaining sanctioning coalitions, which stems from the difference in foreign policy preferences between the primary sender and its potential partners, and the benefit of improved coerciveness of their sanctioning policies. Consequently, primary senders can and often do decide that multilateral sanctioning regimes are not worthwhile. An empirical analysis provides preliminary evidence that primary senders do account for both the cost of including an additional partner and the benefit that the potential partner brings when deciding between the use of multilateral or unilateral sanctions. A model extension shows that results continue to hold when primary senders can use secondary sanctions.

“Opening New Doors: The Geopolitical Cost of Third-Party States in Sanction Imposition”

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Abstract:

What role do third-party states play in the sanction-sending state’s decision to implement and enforce economic sanctions? Although the influence of economic costs of sanction-busting on the sender’s decision has been well-established, geopolitical costs have been overlooked. I argue that third-party states could introduce geopolitical costs for sanctioning states through two channels: sanction-busting and retribution along other foreign policy dimensions. Through geopolitical costs, different types of third-party states could prevent the sanctioner from enforcing, or even imposing, sanctions. Using a game-theoretic model, I demonstrate the sanction-sender’s need to balance between the cost it would incur from implementing and enforcing economic sanctions under the presence of a strategic third-party state and benefits that it would gain from achieving its goals. When the third-party state sanction-busts for geopolitical reasons, the sender is less likely to impose economic sanctions. Similarly, when a third-party state is more likely to retaliate along other foreign policy dimensions, the sanction-sending state is less likely to impose sanctions. The third-party state is more likely to impose geopolitical costs on the sanction-sending state when the issue under sanction is important for the third-party state and when its own preference is sufficiently different from that of the sanction-sender’s. When the sanction issue is more salient or important to the sender, however, the third-party state is less likely to attempt to sanction-bust. The implications of the model are empirically tested directly through an original dataset of sanction waivers granted. One observable, though indirect, implication is that we should expect to find little to no geopolitical loss for the sanctioner as the geopolitically costly sanctions would have been selected out of in advance. To triangulate the effects of sanctions on geopolitical loss for the sender, I apply a novel empirical method that combines the time series matching model and triplet matching to UNGA voting data.

“More Harm than Good? The Effects of Sanctions on Different Aspects of Women’s Rights.” (with Kelly Hunter, Under Review)

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Abstract:

While the linkage between economic growth and women’s rights in low- and middle-income countries has been explored, less emphasis has been placed on how women’s rights are affected by economic statecraft. Prior studies examining the impact of sanctions on women’s rights have focused on economic, political, and social rights codified as laws. We argue that relying on legal rights alone under-predicts and, in some cases, over-predicts the negative outcomes women face as this narrow definition ignores the de facto effects in favor of those that are de jure. What is the impact of economic sanctions on various aspects of women’s rights in the targeted country? Using new data on sanctions from 1960-2019 and new indices on various dimensions of women’s rights, our paper expands the current knowledge of the unintended negative consequences of sanctions by examining women’s societal and health rights. Namely their right to security, inclusion, and health in addition to legal rights. We find that consistent with prior studies, women’s legal rights decline with the presence of sanctions, as do women’s rights to security, and health. While women’s right to inclusion, or the extent to which they are visible in society, decreases 5 years after sanctions have been enacted, these effects are not seen immediately, and political inclusion actually increases. We disaggregate the inclusion index further to tease out how economic factors drive these results. These findings have policy implications for countries interested in promoting sustainable development goals (SDGs), such as SDG 3: Healthy Lives and Well-being and SDG 5: Gender Equality, while also pursuing their own economic statecraft policies. As we move toward 2030, it is important to understand how to employ economic statecraft without derailing the SDGs.

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“Give and Take: The Impact of Foreign Aid Withdrawal on Women’s Societal and Health Rights” (with Kelly Hunter, Under Review)

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Abstract:

What is the impact of foreign aid withdrawal on various aspects of women’s rights in the targeted country? While the linkage between economic growth and women’s rights in low- and middle-income countries has been explored, less emphasis has been placed on how women’s rights are affected by economic statecraft. There is a rich body of literature confirming that women’s rights are uniquely affected by both natural and human-induced disasters and that looking at overall population effects is inadequate when understanding the impact of these events. This paper builds on scholarship that seeks to identify the effects of a specific type of economic shock, economic sanctions, on women’s rights. In particular, we investigate how aid sanctions, defined as aid withdrawal or the termination of foreign aid, impact the various aspects of women’s rights. Examining the impacts of aid sanctions on vulnerable target populations is critical, particularly as countries eschew conflict in favor of sanction instruments, which purportedly inflict less harm on civilians.